Purpose and Governance of the Griffin DDA
What the law lets a DDA do, how its board is set up, how state law shields the city from its debts, and how it helps grow the commercial tax digest.

Why It’s Worth Your Time
City operating costs go up every year. Inflation, public safety payroll, employee health insurance, and debt on big infrastructure like water treatment plants, sewer mains, and arterial streets all push the number higher. If you’re a city commissioner, that leaves you with the same choice every budget season: raise the property tax millage rate or grow the commercial tax digest.
Raising the millage rate gets you an immediate backlash from voters, and it can cost you your seat. Growing the digest is the other road. When the Downtown Development Authority (DDA) helps bring in new businesses, convert upper floors to apartments, and rehab historic buildings, the tax base grows on its own, and property values and quality of life go up for everybody in town.
A bigger commercial digest brings new money into the city without a higher tax bill for homeowners. But downtown work means hard real estate calls. Somebody has to negotiate with private developers, buy blighted properties, and enforce design standards.
Some property owners and residents are going to fight those calls. The DDA absorbs a lot of that political heat and keeps the City Commission out of the day-to-day real estate fights [1]. If you know how the DDA is set up and what the law says it’s for, you can grow the city’s economy and protect your own office at the same time.
The Core Concept
Georgia law lets cities and counties create downtown development authorities under O.C.G.A. Title 36, Chapter 42 [2]. As commissioners, you appoint the seven directors on the DDA board [3]. Directors serve staggered four-year terms under O.C.G.A. Section 36-42-4, so the board never turns over all at once and keeps what it’s learned [4].
State law also sets who can serve. A board member has to own property in the city, live inside the city limits, or run a business inside the downtown development district [5]. The DDA’s work and spending stay inside the legal DDA district boundary and the Central Business District overlay [6]. That keeps public support and incentives aimed at the core commercial blocks instead of spread thin along suburban corridors.
How It Works
The DDA is an independent public corporation and an instrumentality of the state. It has its own corporate powers, separate from city government. Independent doesn’t mean unaccountable, though. State transparency laws still apply:
- Georgia Open Meetings Act: Under O.C.G.A. Section 50-14-1, the DDA board has to do all of its official business, discussion, and voting in properly noticed public meetings, with published agendas and detailed minutes [7].
- Georgia Open Records Act: Under O.C.G.A. Section 50-18-70, the public can see all DDA contracts, communications, financial ledgers, and administrative documents [8].
- Financial Oversight & Audits: The board keeps its own books, separate from the city’s, and sends annual financial reports and independent audits to city and state authorities under O.C.G.A. Section 36-42-5 [9].
Common Mistakes and Risks
A common governance mistake is an elected official stepping into DDA business. That can look like jumping into board negotiations, picking tenants, or leaning on the board to favor a certain developer or constituent. Under O.C.G.A. Section 36-42-12, DDA debts, contracts, and obligations don’t bind the city, and they can’t reach city tax funds [1]. That shield keeps private real estate risk off the city’s books.
When commissioners pressure the board or step into its decisions, they start to erase that legal line between the city and the authority. The buffer goes away, and the public fights, lawsuit risk, and developer disputes land on the City Commission instead. Let the board you appointed review the deals and negotiate the agreements on its own.
Questions Elected Officials Should Ask
When you’re looking at a downtown proposal, reading an authority report, or talking through a project with city staff, ask:
- Will this project measurably grow our commercial tax base and raise productivity per acre in the DDA district?
- Are we respecting the board’s independence and letting directors negotiate without pressure from elected officials?
- Does this fit our current local planning documents and urban redevelopment strategies?
Bottom Line
The DDA grows the local economy, and it also gives you political cover. Keep the board independent and it takes the heat for the hard real estate calls. Let it grow the commercial digest, and that new revenue helps cover rising city costs without a tax increase on residents.
References
- State of Georgia. (2024). O.C.G.A. Section 36-42-12 - DDA Obligations Not Obligations of State or Municipality. https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ga/transforms/ga/ocga/r72/gov.ga.ocga.title.36.html
- State of Georgia. (2024). Downtown Development Authorities Law, O.C.G.A. Title 36, Chapter 42. https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ga/transforms/ga/ocga/r72/gov.ga.ocga.title.36.html
- State of Georgia. (2024). O.C.G.A. Section 36-42-4 - Appointment of Directors. https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ga/transforms/ga/ocga/r72/gov.ga.ocga.title.36.html
- State of Georgia. (2024). O.C.G.A. Section 36-42-4 - Staggered Terms for Directors. https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ga/transforms/ga/ocga/r72/gov.ga.ocga.title.36.html
- State of Georgia. (2024). O.C.G.A. Section 36-42-4 - Qualifications of Directors. https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ga/transforms/ga/ocga/r72/gov.ga.ocga.title.36.html
- City of Griffin. (2023). City of Griffin Code of Ordinances.
- State of Georgia. (2024). Georgia Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A. Section 50-14-1. https://georgia.gov/open-meetings-act
- State of Georgia. (2024). Georgia Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. Section 50-18-70. https://georgia.gov/open-records-act
- State of Georgia. (2024). O.C.G.A. Section 36-42-5 - DDA Financial Reporting and Audits. https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ga/transforms/ga/ocga/r72/gov.ga.ocga.title.36.html